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Abstract—A communication infrastructure is an essential
part to the success of the emerging smart grid. A scalable
and pervasive communication infrastructure is crucial in both
construction and operation of a smart grid. In this paper,
we present the background and motivation of communication
infrastructures in smart grid systems. We also summarize major
requirements that smart grid communications must meet. From
the experience of several industrial trials on smart grid with
communication infrastructures, we expect that the traditional
carbon fuel based power plants can cooperate with emerging
distributed renewable energy such as wind, solar, etc, to reduce
the carbon fuel consumption and consequent green house gas
such as carbon dioxide emission. The consumers can minimize
their expense on energy by adjusting their intelligent home
appliance operations to avoid the peak hours and utilize the
renewable energy instead. We further explore the challenges for a
communication infrastructure as the part of a complex smart grid
system. Since a smart grid system might have over millions of
consumers and devices, the demand of its reliability and security
is extremely critical. Through a communication infrastructure, a
smart grid can improve power reliability and quality to eliminate
electricity blackout. Security is a challenging issue since the
on-going smart grid systems facing increasing vulnerabilities as
more and more automation, remote monitoring/controlling and
supervision entities are interconnected.
Index Terms—Smart grid, communication infrastructure, in-
telligent network, interconnected power system, monitoring,
sensing, cyber security
I. BACKGROUND
SMART grid is a term referring to the next generationpower grid in which the electricity distribution and man-
agement is upgraded by incorporating advanced two-way
communications and pervasive computing capabilities for im-
proved control, efficiency, reliability and safety. A smart grid
delivers electricity between suppliers and consumers using
two-way digital technologies. It controls intelligent appliances
at consumers’ home or building to save energy, reduce cost
and increase reliability, efficiency and transparency [1]. A
smart grid is expected to be a modernization of the legacy
electricity network. It provides monitoring, protecting and
optimizing automatically to operation of the interconnected
elements. It covers from traditional central generator and/or
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emerging renewal distributed generator through transmission
network and distribution system to industrial consumer and/or
home users with their thermostats, electric vehicles, intelligent
appliances [2]. A smart grid is characterized by the bi-
directional connection of electricity and information flows
to create an automated, widely distributed delivery network.
It incorporates the legacy electricity grid the benefits of
modern communications to deliver real-time information and
enable the near-instantaneous balance of supply and demand
management [3].
Many technologies to be adopted by smart grid have
already been used in other industrial applications, such as
sensor networks in manufacturing and wireless networks in
telecommunications, and are being adapted for use in new
intelligent and interconnected paradigm. In general, smart grid
communication technologies can be grouped into five key
areas: advanced components, sensing and measurement, im-
proved interfaces and decision support, standards and groups,
and integrated communications.
Figure 1 illustrates a general architecture for smart grid
communication infrastructures, which includes home area
networks (HANs), business area networks (BANs), neigh-
borhood area networks (NANs), data centers, and substation
automation integration systems [4]. Smart grids distribute elec-
tricity between generators (both traditional power generation
and distributed generation sources) and end users (industrial,
commercial, residential consumers) using bi-directional infor-
mation flow to control intelligent appliances at consumers’
side saving energy consumption and reducing the consequent
expense, meanwhile increasing system reliability and opera-
tion transparency. With a communication infrastructure, the
smart metering/monitoring techniques can provide the real-
time energy consumption as a feedback and correspond to
the demand to/from utilities. Network operation center can
retrieve those customer power usage data and the on-line
market pricing from data centers to optimize the electricity
generation, distribution according to the energy consumption.
In a complex smart grid system, through wide deployment
of new smart grid components and the convergence of existing
information and control technologies applied in the legacy
power grid, it can offer sustainable operations to both utilities
and customers [5]. It can also enhance the efficiency of legacy
power generation, transmission and distribution systems and
penetrate the usage of clean renewable energy by introducing
modern communication systems into smart grids.
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Fig. 1. Smart Grid Communication Infrastructures [4]
The cornerstone of a smart grid is the ability for multiple
entities (e.g. intelligent devices, dedicated software, processes,
control center, etc) to interact via a communication infrastruc-
ture. It follows that the development of a reliable and per-
vasive communication infrastructure represents crucial issues
in both structure and operation of smart grid communication
systems [6], [7]. In this connection, a strategic requirement
in supporting this process is the development of a reliable
communication infrastructure for establishing robust real-time
data transportation through Wide Area Networks (WANs) to
the distribution feeder and customer level [8].
Existing electrical utility WANs are based on a hybrid
of communication technologies including wired technologies
such as fiber optics, power line communication (PLC) sys-
tems, copper-wire line, and a variety of wireless technolo-
gies (i.e. data communications in cellular networks such
as GSM/GPRS/WiMax/WLAN and Cognitive Radio [9]).
They are designed to support some monitoring/controlling
applications as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA)/Energy Management Systems (EMS), Distribution
Management Systems (DMS), Enterprise Resource Plan-
ning (ERP) systems, generation plant automation, distribution
feeder automation and physical security for facilities in wide
range areas with very limited bandwidth and capacity in closed
networks.
Many applications such as energy metering on the smart
grid, have emerged from a decade of research in wireless
sensor networks. However, the lack of an IP-based network
architecture precluded sensor networks from interoperating
with the Internet, limiting their real-world impact. The IETF
chartered the 6LoWPAN and RoLL working groups to specify
standards at various layers of the protocol stack with the
goal of connecting low-power devices to the Internet. In [10]
the authors present the standards proposed by these working
groups, and describe how the research community actively
participates in this process by influencing their design and
providing open source implementations.
The new communication infrastructures should evolve to-
ward nearly ubiquitous data transport networks able to han-
dle power delivery applications along with vast amount of
new data coming from the smart grid applications. These
networks should be scalable, in order to support the present
and the future set of functions characterizing the emerging
smart grid communication technological platform, and highly
pervasive in order to support the deployment of last-mile
communications (i.e. from a backbone to the terminal cus-
tomers locations) [11]. In the rest of this section, we discuss
several key factors for smart grid systems including power line
communications, distributed energy resources, smart metering,
and monitoring and controlling.
A. Power Line Communications
Power line communications (PLCs) uses the power feeder
line as communication media. First generation ripple control
systems provide one-way communications, in which central-
ized load control and peak shaving have been performed
for many years. The European standards body CENELEC
restricted the use of frequencies between 3 kHz and 95 kHz
for two-way communications for electricity distributor use.
A number of second generation PLC systems with low data
rates were proposed in the 1990’s, and Automatic Meter
Reading systems have been deployed based on this technology.
Third generation systems based on OFDM with much higher
data rates are currently being developed and deployed for
Smart Grids, Distribution Automation and Advanced Metering
Management [12].
With the development of smart grids, the PLC on the
power transmission and distribution networks have become
one of the potential technologies to exchange the information
between the end users and the utilities. In order to provide
communication services with different priorities under the
smart grid environment, it is a must to design a PLC system
with variable data rates supported, which means understanding
of the PLC physical channel characteristics become vital. The
testing results in [13] show that the main reason influencing
the reliable communication of high-speed data on power line
is the attenuation of the high-frequency signal, which exhibits
more obviously in the branch of power line. It is almost
impossible to use the frequency range from 10 to 20 MHz
for the reliable communications from distribution transformer
to end user, so it must be solved with the aid of means such
as the repeater and the modulation schemes.
Beside the fact that feeder cables are not designed for
data transmission, they are also prone to be interfered by
the inverter’s outcome. Therefore, PLC modems developed
for domestic applications may not be suitable. Limitations
and difficulties that obstruct transmission are revealed in [14].
Also, it underlines the possibility of communicating in such
an environment and discusses the possible solutions such as
the use of a pulsewidth modulation filter to overcome those
limitations.
The majority of recent contributions have discussed PLC for
high-data-rate applications like Internet access or multimedia
communication serving a relatively small number of users.
However, it lacks the consideration with PLC as an enabler for
sensing, control, and automation in large systems comprising
tens or even hundreds of components spread over relatively
wide areas. In [15], the authors discussed communication
network requirements common to such systems and presented
transmission concepts for PLC to make use of the existing
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power transmission and/or distribution infrastructure resources
(i.e., power lines) to meet these requirements. In [16] the
authors give an overview of DLC+VIT4IP (Distribution Line
Carrier: Verification, Integration and Test of PLC Technologies
and IP Communication for Utilities), a EU funded project
under the 7th Framework Programme (FP7) that aims to
extend the existing PLC technologies by developing efficient
transport of IPv6 protocol, automatic measurement, configu-
ration and management, and security. In addition, the project
DLC+VIT4IP also exploits frequency ranges up to 500 kHz,
to support systems serving larger smart grid applications.
B. Distributed Energy Resources
The legacy power generation and transmission concept is
converting to a massively distributed energy generation land-
scape integrating an extensive number of variable and small
renewable energy resources (DERs) such as wind [17]–[19],
solar [20]–[22] installations with all their challenging effects
on the smart grid.MetaPV [23] is a project demonstrated the
provision of electrical benefits from photovoltaics (PV) on a
large scale, showing the way toward cities powered by renew-
able energy sources. The project also demonstrates enhanced
control capacities implemented into PV inverters, including
active voltage control, low-voltage ride-through capability,
autonomous grid operation, and interaction of distribution
system control with PV systems. Smart control should enable
an increase of the PV penetration in existing power grids and
promote the use of more renewable energy sources in cities
and industries at minimum additional investment costs. The
MetaPV project is funded by the European Commission in
the 7th Framework Programme, which consists of six partners
from four EU countries.
New stakeholders (e.g. energy resource aggregators), more
flexibility for the consumers (energy market place), and totally
new concepts (loading of Electric Vehicles (EVs), usage of
EVs as flexible power storage) have to be respected. Innovative
monitoring and control concepts are required to operate these
distributed energy resources in a reliable and safe way, so the
communication technologies must support it. A key require-
ment for facilitating the distributed production of future grids
is that communication and information are standardized to
ensure interoperability. For example, the IEC 61850 standard,
which was originally aimed at substation automation, has been
expanded to cover the monitoring and control of DERs. By
having a consistent and well-defined data model the standard
enables a DER aggregator, such as a Virtual Power Plant
(VPP), in communicating with a broad array of DERs. If
the data model of IEC 61850 is combined with a set of
contemporary web protocols, it can result in a major shift
in how DERs can be accessed and coordinated. [24] describes
how IEC 61850 can benefit from the REpresentational State
Transfer (REST) service concept and how a server using these
technologies can be used to interface with DERs as diverse as
EVs and micro Combined Heat and Power (µCHP) units.
There are some works (e.g., [25]–[27]) in integrating DER
generation into the traditional centralized carbon fuel based
generation power grid. These energy sources include biomass
etc. A key observation made in [25] is that existing power
grids were designed in a one-direction radial mode without
considering the communication with the emerging distributed
renewable resource generation. In [26] it discussed the broader
implications of the social acceptance of these new energy gen-
eration technologies, as they represent a significant departure
from incumbent approach of traditional monolithic large scale
energy generation. In addition, the implications of regulatory
and economic factors also contribute to potential take-up and
various deployment models to increase the adoption of these
distributed renewable resource generators [27].
Every DER includes an Electronic Power Processor (EPP)
to govern the power exchange with the smart grid and
Switching Power Interface (SPI) to control the currents drawn
from the smart grid. Such distributed EPPs and SPIs should
perform cooperatively to take full advantage of smart grid
potentiality (exploitation of renewable energy sources, power
quality and transmission efficiency). To achieve this goal dif-
ferent approaches can be adopted, depending on the available
communication capability. In [28] it discussed various control
solutions applicable in absence of supervisory control, e.g.,
in residential micro-grids, where communication is possible
between neighbor units only (surround control) or is not
available at all (plug & play control). In micro-grids, where
number and type of DERs and loads is unpredictable and may
vary during time, cooperative operation can be achieved by
simple cross-communication among neighbor EPPs, without
centralized supervisor. In [29], it describes principles of co-
operative operations with existing information and communi-
cation architectures, which allows exploitation of micro-grid
capabilities without additional infrastructure investments.
C. Smart Metering
The Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is a key factor
in the smart grid which is the architecture for automated,
two-way communications between a smart utility meter and a
utility company. A smart meter is an advanced meter which
identifies power consumption in much more detail than a con-
ventional meter and communicates the collected information
back to the utility for load monitoring and billing purposes.
Consumers can be informed of how much power they are
using so that they could control their power consumption
and the consequent carbon dioxide emission. By managing
the peak load through consumer participation, the utility will
likely provide electricity at lower and even rates for all.
AMI has already gained great attraction within the industry,
with the advantages in accuracy and process improvement of
on-line meter reading and control. In [30], additional benefits
are suggested to be gained in managing power quality and
asset management with AMI. This paper also discussed how
reliability, operational efficiency, and customer satisfaction can
be addressed with an AMI deployment. However, the benefits
of AMI are countered by increasing cyber security issues [31].
The technologies require a communication infrastructure to
provide interconnectivity. Hence, the vulnerabilities that ex-
pose other internetworking systems will ultimately lead to
security threats to AMI systems.
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D. Monitoring and Controlling
SCADA systems have been implemented to monitor and
control electrical power grids for decades. The industrial
experience shows that practical deployment of SCADA based
systems may restrict it to the high voltage transmission net-
works only. In [32] the authors made the observation that
existing monitoring and control systems are restricted to the
(high-voltage) transmission network and not suitable for larger
scale monitoring and control of the entire electrical grid. A
distributed monitoring control system is proposed to manage
the power grid. A grid computing solution is proposed to
address these monitoring control needs and the results of the
research for an off-line test environment is discussed. The
key motivations also include the need to support sustainable
and renewable energy source at the micro-generation level. As
SCADA systems evolve, there is much interest in exploring
the security vulnerabilities posed to these systems over com-
munication network and/or internet technologies [33]–[35].
In [36], the solution applies existing Information and
Communication Technology (ICT) systems in a hierarchi-
cal decomposition of the power grid into logical zones for
monitoring and control. It outlines the impact to the control
center responsible for management and control of the electrical
network. It also proposes a framework for future control center
in order to monitor and manage the smart grid. The EU
FP6 project ADINE [37] is based on the Active Network
Management (ANM) concept, where automation, ICT and
power electronics are used to integrate more distributed gener-
ators by exploiting active resources instead of just reinforcing
the network. The resources are mobilized through ancillary
services or requirements. Five enabling solutions within ANM
are pushed forward in the project: Protection relay and fault
location applications, coordinated protection planning, voltage
control with microturbine, centralized voltage control with
SCADA/DMS.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the key
motivations of smart grid communication infrastructures are
discussed in section II. Several industrial trials are shown in
section III. The detailed requirements are presented in section
IV. The challenges are discussed in section V. Conclusions are
drawn in section VI.
II. MOTIVATIONS
In this section, we briefly highlight the key motivations
of communication infrastructures in smart grid systems. As
illustrated in Figure 2, the motivations are related to system,
operation and environment aspects in emerging smart grid
paradigm through communication infrastructures [38].
A. Enhanced Customer Experience
A key objective for communication infrastructures in smart
grid systems is to improve service reliability and quality to
customers which includes reduced outage times when a power
system is interrupted, improved notification of electricity net-
work problems and providing customers with proper options
and tools to understand and optimize their energy usage to
curtail the peak-hour usage to avoid power quality degradation
or blackout [39].
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Fig. 2. Motivations of Smart Grid Communication Infrastructures [38]
B. Increased Productivity
Intelligent performance information and tools will allow
utilities to undertake their current duties in a more efficient
manner, with longer term benefits coming from automating
the smart grid. These gains in productivity will help to reduce
deployment costs and operational costs in managing the smart
grid system [40].
C. Improved Utilization
The communication infrastructure in smart grid will pro-
vide detailed real-time data on distributed energy generation,
electricity transmission, power consumption and market price.
This information allows the utility operators to improve their
decision making processes by identifying which components
are likely to fail and the replacement strategy online [41].
D. Lower Carbon Fuel Consumption/Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sion
A smart grid has the potential to reduce electricity losses
in the network and limit growth in demand, due to embedded
monitoring of the high, medium and low voltage networks
through communication infrastructures, therefore, lower car-
bon fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emission [42].
E. Facilitated Renewable Resource Generation
A smart grid will enable options for renewable generation
and provide customers with the awareness and capabilities to
reduce their energy consumption on carbon fuel based power
[43].
F. Adherence to Regulatory Constraints
New regulatory demands include provisions for increased
levels of asset data tracking (cost justification), and greater
reliability targeting the implementation of communication
infrastructure in smart grid [44].
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Fig. 3. Energy Web Infrastructure [45]
III. CASE STUDIES
The industry has recently undergone a significant trans-
formation of their ICT systems to support both current and
future business models of smart grid operations. Moreover,
the power industry is transforming from the traditional models
of business to embrace a number of new and enhanced
technologies that support future smart grid operations. This
section summaries several smart grid industry projects which
include energy web infrastructure for power generation and
electricity market information exchange, smart metering in-
frastructure which support monitoring and retrieving both
real-time and historical data, smart community for real-time
power consumption monitoring and managing, ZigBee-based
recording system with capability for consumers to view and
manage their power consumption online, and future control
center for power generation and distribution managing and
deciding between utilities through public networks such as
internet.
A. Energy Web
The increasing electricity demand and sustainable devel-
opment of renewable energy resources offer opportunities
for both utilities, brokers, customers to participate into the
development of the emerging energy web. The basic idea of
energy web is to use the Internet to gain bandwidth, reliability
and interconnection for the smart grid. It realizes the on-
demand and demand response in local area by establishing
the balance of power generation and consumption.
In Figure 3, each power generator is interconnected with
an adapted power supplier which has the proper capability of
interpreting the real-time price signal received from the energy
web infrastructure [45]. In order to match the consumption and
generation, the participant strategy is adapted. In the power
market model, each electricity user has option to become a
power generator. The electricity price is generated real-time
and sent to every participants by utility operators using the
smart grid communication infrastructure from the electricity
market. The electricity flows generated by the participants
are monitored in real-time mode by utility operators who
also operate the real-time metering infrastructures such as
automatic meter reading (AMR) or AMI for establishing
the energy demand and supply balance. While the historical
records of both the power consumption and generation with
their corresponding price are periodically sent to the related
offices of the participants for financial settlement.
B. Smart Metering and Infrastructure
BC Hydro [46] is launching a smart metering and infras-
tructure (SMI) program. A multi-level common and integrated
communication infrastructure to enable grid modernization
is planned as illustrated in Figure 4. That means the com-
munication infrastructure will not only support automated
meter readings, customer home appliance connections, but
also future distribution automation, substation automation and
possibly mobile workforce management and other advanced
applications which utilities could envision in the life span (20
years) of AMI infrastructure. This conforms to the industry
vision of integrating communication and IT networks with the
power delivery system, in order to provide system sensing and
control capability [47].
This long term vision raises several key questions: How
much data traffic will flow in the network and how much
bandwidth should be planned for the communication network,
especially for the wide area communication network? How
much of the legacy communication network for system control
purposes (e.g., SCADA system) can be leveraged to deliver a
cost effective solution? These questions are addressed based
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Fig. 4. High Level Common Communication Infrastructure Architecture [47]
on the expected new applications and with communication
and control technology development and system life cycle cost
minimization in mind.
C. Smart Community
A smart community trial deploys automated metering de-
vices into customer’s household. It may include gas, water
and electricity automated metering. The smart community
trial provides customers new tools to manage their energy
consumption hence reduce the related carbon footprint.
Figure 5 provides an overview of the components. The
trial involves the deployment to the scale of 1,000 houses
that communicate using WiMax to several IT systems which
manage the reading of water, gas, and electricity. Customers
can access to an information portal via Home Area Networks
(HAN). This may be accessed by an in-house display panel
or the software based interfaces via the PDA, smart phone or
home personal computer.
The home energy consumption is monitored by those ap-
pliances enabled with intelligent chips which may support the
remote control of appliances operation from Internet. Support
for electrical vehicles will also be provided for home. The data
gathered from this trial can be made available further to the
public, universities, and researchers for the energy efficiency
and environmental protection.
The detailed data on measurements, events, and faults can
be viewed in an example in [48]. In order to retrieve the
historical measurement data, the solution will be able to
display the topology of network at selected historical time
points. While the high voltage transmission network is usually
Fig. 5. Smart Community: Automated Metering Infrastructure [48]
static in terms of its network configuration, the medium and
low voltage networks are considerably more volatile. Hence,
such a historical network view will provide further input to
the central control to assist in diagnosing network faults, and
will also assist operators and engineers in the design of the
smart grid communication infrastructure.
D. A ZigBee-Based Recording System
ZigBee has been designed as a low-cost and low-power-
consumption wireless communication standard by ZigBee
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Fig. 6. System Architecture of a ZigBee-based Smart Meter Recording
System [53]
Alliance [49]. The ZigBee application profile includes home
automation, industrial plant monitoring, commercial build-
ing automation, automatic meter reading, telecom servicese-
commerce, wireless sensor networks, personal and home area
networks [50]–[52].
A smart power-meter and a back-end processing system
are proposed in [53] to be equipped with ZigBee devices
and ZigBee coordinators respectively. With the automatic
networking characteristic of ZigBee, smart power meter serv-
ing as a node apparatus will communicate with the ZigBee
coordinator of rear-end processing system and ZigBee network
can then be constructed to accomplish the meter-reading
function. After the ZigBee network was constructed, the rear-
end processing system can send the request commands to the
ZigBee coordinators and receive the power consumption data
and outage event data from the power meters. Therefore, the
automatic meter reading can be accomplished. The concept
of the proposed outage recording system is illustrated in
Figure 6 while an example of real-time data acquisition is
shown in [53].
E. Future Control Center
In [54], the authors proposed a vision to design and develop
the next-generation monitoring, analysis, and control technolo-
gies to move the industry towards a smarter transmission grid.
As shown in Figure 7, the vision for future control centers,
also referred to as smart control centers, can be a critical part
of the overall framework of the future smart grid. This vision
has five key characteristics as discussed in the following.
1) Human-Centered Online Monitoring: Human-centered
is the key characteristic of the next-generation monitoring
functions in the future smart control centers. In this context,
human-centered has two meanings: information-directed and
customized. The next generation monitoring functions shall
provide operators useful information rather than raw data.
With more and more deployment of monitoring devices (e.g.,
equipment health sensors), it now has more data available to
help system operators monitor the power system condition
in real time. However, more data does not necessarily mean
more information. We need to transform the huge volume of
data into useful information. It is the operators responsibility
to define what information is needed. Since the information
is presented to system operators who are human beings,
the monitoring functions shall employ advanced visualization
techniques with the goal of helping each operator to digest
information quickly.
2) Comprehensive Online Analysis: The next-generation
online analysis functions shall help system operators deter-
mine comprehensive operating boundaries in real time. Com-
prehensive operating boundaries include both thermal limits
and stability (voltage stability and transient stability) limits.
The next-generation online analysis functions shall ap-
ply a comprehensive approach to help system operators de-
termine the operating boundaries. Comprehensive approach
means combination of a simulation-based approach and a
measurement-based approach.
3) From Reactive Analysis to Proactive Analysis: The
present online analysis is based on the current operating
condition. This does not consider future system conditions.
In the future, online analysis shall take a proactive approach
to perform look-ahead simulation on the future system condi-
tions.
The integration of renewable energy sources will introduce
more uncertainties into the power system. With the ability
to foresee potential problems, the next-generation proactive
online analysis will optimize resources (such as demand
response and energy storage) in order to improve reliability
and achieve economic operation.
By enabling sufficient foresight, the next-generation anal-
ysis functions allow system operators to take a proactive
approach to develop optimal control strategies and mitigation
plans.
4) From Isolated Protection and Control Strategy to Coor-
dinated Protection and Control Strategy: Traditionally, each
control scheme is designed to solve a particular problem.
The parameters were developed based on offline simulations
and largely remain fixed. There is a lack of coordination
among protection and control systems. As modern power
systems have become more interconnected with increasing
stress levels, each disturbance may cause multiple protection
and control schemes to respond. There may exist negative
interactions that can worsen system conditions, which present
challenges and risks in system operations.
When a power system experiences a disturbance, the next
generation coordinated protection and control systems will
perform according to the optimal control strategies developed
by online security assessment and shall quickly bring the
system to a stable operating condition with minimum control
efforts.
5) Self-Healing System Control: The current restoration
plans are developed through offline studies based on as-
sumptions regarding likely scenarios. However, the restoration
strategy developed from such studies may not work well
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Fig. 7. Scopes of Future Control Center [54]
following a blackout because the real operational situation may
vary from the assumed scenarios.
When part or all of the power system is blacked out, the
next generation self-healing control scheme shall effectively
restore the system and bring it back to a normal operating
condition.
IV. REQUIREMENTS
Monitoring/sensing, communication and control are the
three fundamental building blocks that will convert a power
distribution system into a smart grid. Monitoring/sensing will
have the ability to detect malfunctions or deviations from
normal operational ranges that would warrant actions. Further,
since in a smart grid, a point of electricity consumption can
also become a point of generation, the sensing process will
be closely linked with the metering process. Communications
will allow inputs from sensors to be conveyed to the control el-
ements in the smart grid which will generate control messages
for transmission to various points in the smart grid resulting
in appropriate actions. The communication infrastructure has
to be robust enough to accept inputs from a user and make it
an integral part of the process. By the same token, the user
must be capable of getting the appropriate level of information
from the smart grid. The major requirements for smart grid
communication infrastructures are discussed in the rest of this
section.
A. QoS
In order to realize a practical smart grid communication
infrastructure, it is necessary to have guaranteed Quality of
Service (QoS) for the communication and networking tech-
nology used in the smart grid, ranging from power generation,
transmission, distribution, to the customer applications.
1) Latency: The real-time operational data communications
in smart grid include online sensor/meter reading and power
system control signals. The communication is characterized
by the fact that most of interactions must take place in real
time, with hard time bound. The communication require-
ments define the design of the technical solutions. For real-
time sensing/metering purposes, reading messages should be
transmitted within a very short time frame. For instance, the
maximum allowed time is in the range of 12-20 ms, depending
on the type of protection scheme which origins from the
fact that the disconnection of fault current should within
approximately 100 ms. Power System Control signals mainly
include supervisory control of the power process on secondary
or higher levels. These systems are of the kind SCADA/EMS.
Measured values must not be older than 15 seconds, when
arriving at the control center. Breaking information shall
arrive no later than 2 seconds after the emergency event has
occurred [55].
2) Bandwidth: As more and more interconnected intelli-
gent elements are added to the electricity network with the
evolution of the smart grid, the communication infrastruc-
ture should be able to transport more and more messages
simultaneously without severe effect on latency. The network
bandwidth must increase faster than the demand of these
interconnected intelligent elements in the network.
C. H. Hauser et al. concluded in [56] that a 10 millisecond
average latency for a 400 bit message using a T1 line will
result in a utilization of only 6% of the T1 bandwidth. In [55]
the authors modeled the communication bandwidth require-
ments for a moderate size electricity distribution system. In
this model, a distribution substation is connected to 10,000
feeders and each feeder connects to 10 customers. Assuming
that every electric meter generates a message every second
to the distribution substation, the total is 100,000 messages
per second. The feeders themselves will generate messages
to each other and to the distribution substation. The authors
in [55] modeled the messages in the smart grid arriving at
servers located at the control center as M/M/1 traffic. Then,
the transmission line bandwidth is evaluated over 100 Mbps
through the M/M/1 queuing model. It can be observed that this
situation results in a very poor bandwidth utilization of the
transmission facilities as well. Unfortunately, a higher level
of utilization will not permit meeting the assumed latency
constraint.
B. Interoperability
Interoperability of a smart grid is the ability of diverse
systems to work together, use the compatible parts, exchange
information or equipment from each other, and work coop-
eratively to perform tasks. It enables integration, effective
cooperation, and two-way communications among the many
interconnected elements of the smart grid. The National Insti-
tute for Standards and Technology (NIST) works as the first
International Coordinator for smart grid interoperability [57].
NIST developed a framework that includes protocols and
standards for information management to achieve interoper-
ability of smart grid devices and systems [58]. NIST has
developed a three phase approach to identify smart grid stan-
dards. Phase 1 addresses the engagement of stakeholders in
a participatory public process to identify applicable standards
and gaps in currently available standards and priorities for new
standardization activities, ending with the final publication of
the framework report after public comments have been incor-
porated. Phase 2 will establish a private-public partnership and
form a smart grid interoperability panel to drive longer-term
progress. Phase 3 will develop and implement a framework
for testing and certification of how standards are implemented
in smart grid devices, systems, and processes.
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Fig. 8. NIST Conceptual Model [59]
As illustrated in Figure 8, the NIST conceptual reference
model identifies seven domains as bulk generation, trans-
mission, distribution, markets, operations, service providers,
and customers and major actors and applications within each.
The reference model also identifies interfaces among domains
and actors and applications over which information must
be exchanged and for which interoperability standards are
needed.
For years, the utility industry has been using optical port
communications, defined by ANSI C12.18, and telephone
modem communications, defined by ANSI C12.21, to get
metering data, defined by ANSI C12.19, from the field to
the back office. While the two communication standards have
been employed to great success, the missing was a standard
method for using true network communications for exchanging
the data. Recent work has completed by ANSI C12.22, a
standard for interfacing the data communication networks, as
well as updating the optical port and modem communication
standards. This set of standards offers the industry an open and
comprehensive protocol suite to transport the newly revised
data standard, ANSI C12.19 [60].
C. Scalability
A smart grid communication infrastructure needs the scala-
bility of accommodating more and more devices and services
into it and more end-user interaction real-time monitoring
of energy meters. As discussed by Lobo et al. [61], an
IP-based network will provide an effective solution for the
communication needs of the smart grid. An IP-based network
as the backbone makes use of new technologies independent of
the service implemented by the distributed network operator.
The cost of deployment and maintenance can be reduced
significantly using IP-based technologies.
D. Security
According to the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI),
one of the emergent requirements facing the smart grid devel-
opment is related to cyber security of systems. As indicated
in the EPRI report [62], cyber security is a critical issue
due to the increasing potential of cyber attacks and incidents
against this critical sector as it becomes more and more
interconnected. Cyber security must address not only delib-
erate attacks, such as from disgruntled employees, industrial
espionage, and terrorists, but also inadvertent compromises of
the information infrastructure due to user errors, equipment
failures, and natural disasters. Vulnerabilities might allow
an attacker to penetrate a network, gain access to control
software, and alter load conditions to destabilize the grid in
unpredictable ways.
There are many organizations working on the development
of smart grid security requirements including North Amer-
ican Electrical Reliability Corporation-Critical Infrastructure
Protection (NERC-CIP), ISA, IEEE (1402), the National In-
frastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), and NIST [63].
One prominent source of requirements is the Smart Grid
Interoperability Panel (SGiP) Cyber Security Working Group,
previously NIST Cyber Security Coordination Task Group
(CSCTG). NIST CSCTG was established to ensure the con-
sistency in the cyber security requirements across all the
smart grid domains and components. The draft document from
the CSWG, NIST interagency Report (NIST IR) 7628 [64],
continues to evolve. NIST and DoE Gridwise Architecture
Council (GWAC) [65] has established Domain Expert Working
Groups (DEWGs) [66]: Home-to-Grid (H2G), Building-to-
Grid (B2G), Industrial-to-Grid (I2G), Transmission and Dis-
tribution (T&D) and Business and Policy (B&P). Furthermore,
many other standards may apply, including ISO 17799 [67],
FIPS 201 [68], other NIST SPs, and DISA Security Technical
Implementation Guides (STIGs) [69]. Working with standards
bodies, such as NIST and others, will be extremely important
to ensure a highly secure, scalable, consistently deployed
smart grid communication system, as these standards bodies
will drive the security requirements of the smart grid commu-
nication systems [70].
One thing is consistent among the various standards bodies:
the security of the smart grid communications will strongly
depend on authentication, authorization, and privacy technolo-
gies. Privacy technologies are well matured. Federal Infor-
mation Processing Standard (FIPS) has approved Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) and Triple Data Encryption Algo-
rithm (3DES) solutions, offering strong security and high per-
formance, are readily available. The specific privacy solutions
required will depend on the type of communication resource
being protected. As a specific example, NIST has determined
that 3DES solution will likely become insecure by the year
2030. Considering that utility components are expected to have
long lifetimes, AES would be the preferred solution for new
components. However, it is expected the legacy functionality
such as 3DES must be supported for system compatibility,
therefore there is a risk of compromising the system [71].
Wireless links will be secured with technologies from well
known standards such as 802.11i [72] and 802.16e [73].
Different wireless protocols have varying degrees of security
mechanisms. Wired links will be secured with the technologies
such as firewalls, virtual private networks (VPN) and IPSec.
Higher layer security mechanism such as Secure Shell (SSH)
and Security Socket Layer (SSL)/Transport Layer Security
(TLS) should also be used. System architects and designers
often identify the need for and specify the use of secure
protocols, such as SSH and IPSec, but then skip the details
associated with establishing security associations between end
points of communications. Such an approach is likely to result
in a system where the necessary procedures for secure key
management can quickly become an operational nightmare. It
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is due to the fact that, when system architects do not develop
an integrated and comprehensive key management scheme,
customers may be provided with few key management options,
and often resort to manually pre-configuring symmetric keys.
This approach is simple for the system designers, but it can
be very expensive for the system owner/operator.
What has been learned from years of deploying and oper-
ating large secure network communication systems is that the
efforts required to provision symmetric keys into thousands
of devices can be too expensive or insecure. The development
of key and trust management schemes for large network
deployments is required; these systems can be leveraged from
other industries, such as mobile radio systems and Associa-
tion of Public-Safety Communications Officials (APCO) radio
systems. Several APCO-deployed systems provide statewide
wireless coverage, with tens of thousands of secure de-
vices [74]. Trust management systems, based on public-key
infrastructure (PKI) technology, could be customized specifi-
cally for smart grid operators, easing the burden of providing
security which adheres to the standards and guidelines that are
known to be secure.
All of the above technologies rely on some sort of key
management. Considering that the smart grid will contain
millions of devices, spread across hundreds of organizations,
the key management systems used must be scalable to ex-
traordinary levels. Further, key management must offer strong
security (authentication and authorization), inter-organization
interoperability, and the highest possible levels of efficiency
to ensure that unnecessary cost due to overhead, provisioning,
and maintenance are minimized. It is likely that new key
management systems (specialized to meet the requirements
of smart grid) will be needed.
E. Standardization
The smart grid involves various standards in many fields
such as power generation, delivery and control besides com-
munications. IEEE has recently taken the initiative to define
these standards and write guidelines on how the smart grid
should operate using the latest technology in power engi-
neering, control, communications, and information technology.
The standards group that was created is known as the IEEE
P2030 group [75]. Three task forces were formed to tackle dis-
tribution systems including the integration of different energy
sources, transmission substations, load side requirements, and
cyber security. These task forces will focus on power engineer-
ing technology, information technology, and communication
technology. The power engineering technology group will
work on the functional requirements of interoperability, draw-
ing on various existing and ongoing efforts by groups such as
International Society of Automation (ISA) and International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). IEC TC57 WG13 [76]
is currently drafting the new international standards for use
in improving overall transmission grid reliability and security.
This work directly supports the NIST smart grid interoperabil-
ity.
The information technology group will look at the issues
of privacy, security, data integrity, interfaces, and interoper-
ability. The communication technology group will define the
communication requirements between devices in the smart
grid and establish boundaries for generation, transmission, and
distribution in conjunction with the customers [77].
Implementing standards is a major issue in transitioning
towards advanced sensing/automation, and also is a crucial
step in creating smart grid communication infrastructure. As
communication systems in smart grid are usually from differ-
ent vendors with their own legacies, which are proprietary
and have no dual interoperability. The identified standards
which govern the necessary integration of different functions
are specified by IEC.
V. CHALLENGES
The proliferation of wireless/wired sensors and communi-
cation devices and the emergence of embedded computing
represents an opportunity to develop applications for con-
nected environments in general, and especially management
systems that address urgent challenges facing the smart grid
communication infrastructure. The challenges include the de-
ployment of large-scale embedded computing, legacy power
grids, intelligent appliances, and next-generation communi-
cations and collaborations that will provide the foundation
for a post-carbon society. In this section, we discuss the
context that gives these challenges urgency as well as the
technical challenges that need to be addressed by smart grid
communication infrastructures.
A. Complexity
A smart grid communication infrastructure is a system
of systems and it is extremely complex. As a consequence,
modeling, analysis and design a suitable communication in-
frastructure meet many new challenges. The models to be
used must be capable of accounting for uncertainty as a
way to simulate emerging behavior. The numerical tools to
perform the analysis must be capable of solving very large
scale problems. In fact, the power system is tightly coupled
and non-linear [78] and does not benefit from the sparsity that
typically characterized this problem. The control system and
particularly communication infrastructure must be designed
to manage uncertainty and inconsistencies to be resilient or
gracefully degrade when necessary. Finally the performance
metric must be adjusted to the new nature of the power
system. The challenges in modeling the complexity of a
smart grid communication infrastructure are summarized in
the following.
1) Need to support multi-physics approach: Systems are so
tightly interconnected that is not possible to simply simulate
the electrical subsystem [79]
2) Need to support multidisciplinary approach: Different
users will have to work at the same scenario, each of them
focusing on different aspects (control, power flow, communi-
cations) [80], [81].
3) Need to support dynamic and reconfigurable model level
definition: This is probably the most challenging element.
While different users interact with the simulation schematic
they need to focus on different details of the system. The
next generation simulation system should support this process
automatically [82], [83].
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4) Need to provide high-level graphic visualization to sup-
port system: While engineers may want to focus on the
details of graphs, system analysis requires different types of
visualization able to synthesize a “system-picture” [84].
5) Need to provide support for uncertainty propagation:
Uncertainty is presented in the power system for different
reasons and from various sources. And therefore it is to be
accounted for in the design and in the operation, as it will be
dependent on static and dynamic state estimation [85].
B. Efficiency
Realization of the future smart grid requires meeting the
ever increasing efficiency challenges by harnessing modern
communication and information technologies to enable a
communication infrastructure that provides grid-wide coor-
dinated monitoring and control capabilities. Such commu-
nication infrastructure should be capable of providing fail
proof and nearly instantaneous bidirectional communications
among all devices ranging from individual loads to the grid-
wide control centers including all important equipment at the
electricity distribution and transmission system. This involves
processing vast number of data transactions for analysis and
automation. It requires a high performance communication
infrastructure capable of providing fast intelligent local sub-
second responses coordinated with a higher level global anal-
ysis in order to prevent or contain rapidly evolving adverse
events [86]. It needs to meet the challenges in the following.
1) Better Telemetry: Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU)
technology [87] can offer faster, time-stamped, higher ac-
curacy and sub-second scanning to enable timely grid-wide
situational awareness [87].
2) Faster Controls: Based on power electronics, smart grid
communication infrastructure enables fast automated control
actions, for voltage and power flow management at electricity
generation, transmission and distribution systems.
3) More Robust Controls: Proactive and adaptive adjust-
ment of protection and communication settings for wide area
monitoring and controls support intentional islanding, which
is beyond currently employed ad-hoc schemes in system
protection.
4) Embedded Intelligent Device Communications: To en-
able adaptive and intelligent communications for device level
fault diagnosis and bad data identification, operations and the
constraints should be prescribed by system operators or control
centers, intelligent remedial action scheme (RAS)/system pro-
tection schemes (SPS), autonomous restoration of equipment
and autonomous local control actions [88].
5) Integrated and Secure Communications: Highly dis-
tributed and pervasive communications based on open stan-
dards allow flexible network configurability to assure fail-
proof monitoring and automation for bidirectional communi-
cations between all operators and customers.
6) Enhanced Computing Capabilities: Fail-proof and se-
cure communication systems for reliable analysis support
operator decisions and autonomous intelligent agents a geo-
graphically and temporally coordinated hierarchy through the
grid-wide communication infrastructure [89].
7) Internet Technology: Internet protocols to facilitate data
exchange, process control and cyber security implement a
distributed architecture with open interfaces. Plug-and-play
hardware and software components in a service oriented archi-
tecture is based on communication standards and technologies
such as message oriented middleware and web services to
enable seamless integration of the IT infrastructure ranging
from lowest equipment level Intelligent Electronic Devices
(IEDs) to all higher application levels [90].
C. Reliability
A framework for cohesive integration of reliability tech-
nologies facilitate convergence of the needed standards and
protocols, and implementation of necessary analytical capabil-
ities. This subsection reviews the impact of a communication
infrastructure to the reliability of a smart grid. An ideal mix
of the current communication and control techniques are ex-
pected to lead a flatter net demand that eventually accentuates
many reliability issues further. A grid-wide communication
architectural framework to meet these reliability challenges
are discussed in the following [91].
1) Renewable Resources: Renewable resources generally
have adverse challenges on smart grid reliability due to the
following factors: variability and low capacity, factors making
the net demand profile steeper, low correlation with the load
profile especially in the case of wind resource, relatively
high forecast errors especially for longer horizons, congestion
issues at transmission level due to large installations and
at distribution level due to dispersed resources. Operational
performance issues such as voltage and regulation.
To address the variability of the net demand, as renewable
resources growing over the long run, efficient communica-
tion infrastructure for information exchange among demand
response, storage devices and utilization of plug-in electric
vehicles (PEVs)/plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV) will
complement the remedies [92].
2) Demand Response: Demand response allows consumer
load reduction in response to emergency and high price con-
ditions on the smart grid. Such conditions are more prevalent
during peak load or congested operation as illustrated in
Figure 9 [93]. Non-emergency demand response in the range
of 5% to 15% of system peak load can provide substantial
benefits in reducing the need for additional resources and
lowering real-time electricity prices [2]. Demand response
does not substantially change the total energy consumption
since a large fraction of the energy saved during the load
curtailment period is consumed at a more opportune time -
thus a flatter load.
3) Load Management: Load rejection as an emergency
resource to protect the smart grid from disruption is well
understood and is implemented to operate either by system
operator command or through under-frequency and/or under-
voltage relays. In a smart grid, the load rejection schemes can
be enhanced to act more intelligently and based on customer
participation.
Price based demand response/load management as a system
resource to balance demand and supply has not been widely
adopted yet. Contract based participation has been typically
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Fig. 9. Communications for Demand Response [93]
below 5% of peak load [94]. In a smart grid, real-time
price information enables wider voluntary participation by
consumers. Demand response can be implemented through
either automatic or manual response to price signals, or
through a bidding process based on direct communications
between the consumers and the market/system operators or
through intermediaries such as aggregators or local utilities.
4) Storage Devices: Most of the existing storage resources
are hydro and pumped storage. However, growth potential for
these resources is much smaller than the need for storage
necessary to counter growing net demand variability presented
by new wind and solar resources. Various storage technologies
are emerging to fill the gap. Battery storage appears to be
most promising due to improvements in technology as well as
economies of scale.
Storage resources tend to make the net demand profile flatter
and, as such, are expected to improve reliability. In addition,
most battery storage devices can respond in time scales of
seconds. Hence they can become valuable enablers of fast
controls in a smart grid. Storage resources of various sizes
can be distributed throughout the grid ranging from end user
loads to major substations and central power stations. This
feature can help to alleviate congestion at both transmission
and distribution levels [95].
5) Electric Transportation: Plug-in electric vehicles (PEV,
PHEV, etc.) continue to become more popular as environmen-
tal concerns increase. They are a significant means to reduce
green house gases and reliance on fossil fuels. They will be a
significant factor in load growth with a potential to eventually
consume 600 TWh/year assuming 30 kwh for a 100-mile
trip [96], and 10,000 miles per year for 200 million vehicles
in the U.S. For greater adoption of all-electric vehicles, the
issue of recharge time has to be resolved. Long recharge times
lead to generally unacceptable level of vehicle unavailability
and short recharge times have potential to increase congestion,
especially at the distribution levels [97].
From reliability viewpoint, electric transportation has fea-
tures similar to both demand response resources and storage
resources. As PHEVs present a significant factor of load
growth, this can also aggravate the demand variability and
associated reliability problems depending on the charging
schemes and consumer behavioral patterns.
D. Security
Based on the evolution of power system communication
infrastructures and the concern of cyber security, many new
issues have arisen in the context of smart grid.
Fig. 10. Information Security Domains [99]
1) Information Security Domains: Since the SCADA/EMS
systems have become increasingly integrated, it becomes more
difficult to treat the system structure in terms of parts or
subsystems. The physical realization of various functions is
less evident from a user perspective. Instead, it becomes more
natural to study a SCADA/EMS system in terms of domains.
This concept in application to power systems was introduced
in [98].
A domain is a specific area, wherein specific activ-
ities/business operations are going on and they can be
grouped together. The security domains are introduced in
Figure 10 [99].
When communicating across power utilities, different or-
ganizations and companies, using communication networks,
the security domains should be recognized. For example, a
power utility company could define a security domain and
related policies and procedures for its telecontrol activity to
assure compliance with legislative or regulatory requirements.
If similar definitions, procedures, policies, etc. were developed
by other power utility companies, it would be easier to discuss
and define common rules for the information exchange or the
usage of common resources in a communication infrastructure.
However today, there are no common definitions including the
term security. Also, there are no common control system secu-
rity policies or procedures, although groups such as IEC [100],
ISA [101], and NIST [102], [103], are working on generic
policies and procedures.
2) Government Coordination on SCADA Security: A gov-
ernment coordination action between different authorities and
agencies were started in [104], focusing on SCADA secu-
rity. The action is based on the participation of the power
utilities, water companies, and railway systems, which have
SCADA systems as the critical part of operations. Also,
the security policies are represented. Here, the expertise is
gathered and experiences are shared, including both domestic
and international knowledge; everything with the purpose
of securing the SCADA systems being part of the critical
information infrastructures. As a natural step, the SCADA Se-
curity Guideline has been developed in [105]. Also, technical
guidelines and administrative recommendations are developed
which are available for free downloading, that support the
securing actions of the SCADA systems in the different areas
of operations: power, water, and transportation.
3) De-Coupling Between Operational SCADA/EMS and
Admin IT: When the existing SCADA/EMS systems are being
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Fig. 11. Vulnerable Access Points to SCADA System [99]
refurbished or replaced, the information and IT security issues
must be taken into account. If a SCADA/EMS system is to be
refurbished, the operational SCADA/EMS system part must be
shielded from the administrative part, such that the operational
part is protected from digital threats that are possible over
the Internet connection. If a SCADA/EMS system is to be
replaced, it is then a good occasion to reconsider an overall
system structure, and then incorporate IT security on all
SCADA/EMS levels. A way towards this more secure state is
to, if possible, de-couple the operational SCADA/EMS system
and the administrative IT system. Also, an alternative may be
to secure the firewall configuration in between operational and
administrative parts.
4) Threats: The fact that SCADA/EMS systems are now
being interconnected and integrated with external systems
creates new possibilities and threats in cyber security. Some
of these new issues have been emphasized in [98] and [106].
The various interconnections of a substation were investigated
in [107], as shown in Figure 11. All the numbered access
points (1-10) elucidates the possible points where to the
substation can be accessed. This number creates an operational
environment that implies possible digital entrances and hence
digital vulnerabilities at the same time.
5) Vulnerability: As presented in [108], using a wireless
sensor network (WSN) in AMI in a smart grid is so vulnerable
to be attacked by an intelligent adversary even with an
ordinary microwave stove. Brodsky et al. [109] documented
a denial-of-service attack on IEEE 802.15.4 wireless sensor
networks used within the smart grid. The equipment needed
for such an attack is inexpensive (about $70).
6) Privacy: The privacy of terminal customers and smart
metering networks is important to the eventual acceptance by
the public. Research in this area is going on and smart meter
users will need to be reassured that their data is secure. In
[110] the authors describe a method for securely anonymizing
frequent (e.g., every few minutes) electrical metering data
sent by a smart meter. Although such frequent metering data
may be required by a utility or electrical energy distribution
network for operational reasons, this data may not necessarily
need to be attributable to a specific smart meter or consumer.
However, it needs to be securely attributable to a specific
location (e.g. a group of houses or apartments) within the
smart grid.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented the background and motivation
for smart grid communication infrastructures. We showed that
a smart grid built on the technologies of sensing, communica-
tions, and control technologies offer a very promising future
for utilities and users. We reviewed several industrial trials
and summarized the basic requirements of communication
infrastructures in smart grid paradigm. Efficiency, reliability
and security of interconnected devices and systems are critical
to enabling smart grid communication infrastructures. Interop-
erability must be achieved while avoiding being isolated into
noncompetitive technical solutions and the need for wholesale
replace of existing power communication systems. Alignment
behind technical standards must be balanced with creating an
environment that encourages innovation so that the overall
communication infrastructure may continue to evolve. Based
on the above survey, we can focus on those challenges to smart
grid communication infrastructures in both system design and
operations to make it more efficient and secure.
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